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Abstract
We study the delegation problem between an investor and a financial intermediary.
The intermediary has private information about the state of the world that determines
the return of the investment. Moreover, he has superior awareness of the available
investment opportunities and decides whether to reveal some of them to the investor.
We show that the intermediary generally has incentives to make the investor aware
of investment opportunities at the extremes, e.g. very risky and very safe projects,
while leaving the investor unaware of intermediate investment options. We study how
the extent to which the intermediary reveals available investment opportunities to the
investor depends on the investor’s initial awareness and the degree of competition be-
tween intermediaries in the market.
JEL Codes: D82, D83, G24.
1 Introduction
One of the many striking features of the recent financial crisis was the extreme exposure of
investors to risk. Both investment and commercial banks had been selling excessively risky
assets to investors, sometimes hiding some of the asset characteristics (e.g., Gerardi et al.,
2008). At the same time, despite the impressive amount of new financial instruments and
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the rapidly changing financial world, since the 1950s a large fraction (of approx. 33% in
the US) of investment demand has remained on ’safe’ assets (e.g., Gordon et al. (2008) and
Garcia (2012)).
Most of financial investments are intermediated by professionals. Financial intermediaries
are non-neutral brokers and, as such, direct, influence, and distort the demand of assets in
the economy. For instance, investment bankers commonly underwrite transactions of newly
issued securities, whereby they raise investment capital from investors on behalf of corpora-
tions and governments both for equity and debt capital. Such practices give rise to conflicts
of interest, sometimes leading to investments that are not necessarily in the best interest of
the client. At the same time, investors di↵er widely in their financial literacy. They not only
face limits in their ability to assess the profitability of particular investments, but often also
have limited awareness of the available investment opportunities and must therefore rely on
professional advice.
This paper studies the implications of such limitations by incorporating unawareness
into the canonical delegation problem. Specifically, we consider the problem of an investor
(the principal, she) who needs to choose how to invest her savings and delegates the task
of picking the right project to a financial intermediary (the agent, he). The intermediary
has private information about the payo↵s of each investment opportunity and the investor’s
problem is to determine a set of projects from which the intermediary chooses upon observ-
ing the state of the world (see for example Alonso and Matouschek, 2008). We then depart
from the traditional framework by considering a situation where the intermediary not only
has better information on what the best investment choice is, but also on the actual set of
available investment opportunities. This second dimension of asymmetry is captured by the
assumption that the investor is only partially aware of the feasible investment projects. Be-
fore the delegation stage the intermediary has then the possibility to expand the investor’s
awareness by revealing additional investment opportunities. We are interested in the im-
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plications of the investor’s unawareness on the interaction with the intermediary. Will the
intermediary expand the investor’s awareness? If so, which projects will the intermediary
disclose/not disclose? What are the properties of the investment projects eventually realized?
We address these questions in an environment with a continuum of states and a contin-
uum of investment projects, some of which the investor is aware of. The intermediary’s and
investor’s preferences are represented by quadratic loss functions, with di↵ering bliss points
for the two agents. We view the bliss point to be the investment opportunity which generates
the best combination between risk, illiquidity, and return as a function of the state. The
divergence between the investor’s and intermediary’s bliss point can be interpreted as banks
being less risk averse, having limited liability, having di↵erent liquidity needs, etc. When
deciding on the set of projects from which the intermediary can select, the investor then
faces the usual tradeo↵ between granting flexibility to the intermediary so he can react on
his private information and precluding the intermediary from choosing projects he is biased
towards too often.
We show that the consideration of unawareness has important implications for delegation
and investment. In the benchmark case of full awareness, under certain regularity conditions
on the distribution of states, the optimal delegation set for the investor is an interval. E↵ec-
tively, the investor imposes a cap: if, for instance, the intermediary is less risk averse than
the investor, the investor places an upper bound on the riskiness of projects the intermediary
can select. In our environment, where projects are ordered along the real line, this translates
into a threshold below which the intermediary is free to choose and above which he is not
allowed to take an action. Imposing the same regularity condition on the distribution of
states, we characterize the equilibrium delegation set in an environment where the investor
is partially unaware. Our main result shows that the intermediary makes the investor fully
aware if and only if the investor is initially aware of the project at the optimal threshold
under full awareness. If this is not the case, the intermediary leaves the investor unaware
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of an interval of projects around the threshold. The intermediary thus makes the investor
aware of investment opportunities at the extremes (e.g. very safe and very risky projects),
while he does not disclose intermediate investment opportunities. This makes it optimal
for the investor to permit projects at both extremes and thus gives the intermediary the
possibility to invest in them.
Next, we introduce competition among intermediaries by incorporating our baseline
model into a search environment with imperfect competition. In this framework multiple
intermediaries compete for investors over the set of investment opportunities they disclose:
the larger this set is, the larger are the chances of attracting an investor. We show that,
for intermediate degrees of competition, in equilibrium an intermediary either reveals every-
thing or leaves investors unaware of a significant set of investment options. We thus obtain
polarization in the market: some banks fully disclose all investment opportunities, others
try to obtain a higher profit by concealing some of them.
Finally, we discuss the policy implications of our findings. Clearly, promoting financial
literacy among investors improves their welfare in our model. Interestingly though, our re-
sults show that it is not necessary to educate investors about all possible investment projects.
Instead, we demonstrate that making investors aware of only one intermediate project - at
the optimal threshold in the benchmark case of full awareness - is enough. Making investors
aware of this project gives incentives to intermediaries to reveal all remaining projects as
well. We therefore have an interesting complementarity between the regulator and the mar-
ket, suggesting a surprisingly simple, yet powerful, policy intervention.
The paper makes two main contributions. First, it makes a methodological contribution
in that we introduce limited awareness into the model of delegation. The potential applica-
tions are much broader than the financial market. Second, the stated framework is able to
generate predictions on the equilibrium portfolio di↵erentiation, in particular on the demand
4
of safe and risky assets, as a function of the nature of misalignment between the investor
and the financial intermediary.
Related Literature: This paper is first of all related to the literature on optimal del-
egation. Starting with Holmstrom (1984), who first defines the delegation problem and
provides conditions for the existence of its solution, this literature, which includes Mela-
mud and Shibano (1991), Martimort and Semenov (2006), Alonso and Matouschek (2008),
Armstrong and Vickers (2010) and Amador and Bagwell (2013), studies optimal delegation
problems in environments of increasing generality. None of them consider limited awareness
in this framework. Furthermore, this paper is related to a small literature on contract theory
and unawareness. The application of the concept of unawareness to contracting problems
is still at its beginnings. In contrast to our setting, existing work considers contracting
problems where contingent transfers are feasible and where the agent is unaware - either of
possible actions (Von Thadden and Zhao, 2012 and 2014) or of possible states (Zhao, 2011;
Filiz-Ozbay, 2012; Auster, 2013), while the principal is fully aware.
This paper is also related to the literature on financial intermediation which sees banks
as ’e cient’ brokers who reduce transaction and information costs. The issue of this role of
financial intermediation has been studied by many authors starting from Diamond (1984).
A summary of the literature can be found in Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) and Allen and
Santomero (1998). These works focus on the possibility of partially monitoring the financial
intermediaries ex-post. Most of the work is on the load provision side of the banks and on
the design of the optimal loan contract, whereas we concentrate on the brokerage role of
banks.
2 Environment
There is an investor (she) who acts as the principal and a financial intermediary (he) who acts
as the agent. The intermediary has access to a set of investment projects Y = [ymin, ymax],
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the return to which depends on the state of the world. Let ⇥ = [0, 1] be the set of states and
let F (✓) denote the cumulative distribution function on ⇥, assumed to be twice di↵erentiable
in [0, 1].1 Both the investor and the intermediary have a von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility
function that takes the quadratic form
u(y, ✓) =  (y   ✓)2 and v(y, ✓) =  (y   (✓    ))2.
The intermediary’s preferred policy is y = ✓, while the investor’s preferred policy is y = ✓  .
We assume   > 0, hence the intermediary has an upward bias of size  .2 In Appendix A
we provide a micro foundation for the assumed utility functions by starting with preferences
defined over the mean and variance of the investment. Assuming that the intermediary is less
risk averse than the investor, the bias b then captures the di↵erence between the investor’s
and the intermediary’s preferred investment on the mean-variance frontier. Accordingly, we
can interpret low values of y in [ymin, ymax] as relatively safe investments and high values of
y as relatively risky ones.
As in the canonical delegation problem, we assume that the intermediary is informed
about the state of the world ✓, while the investor is not. We rule out monetary transfers and
assume that the intermediary’s participation constraint is always satisfied. The contracting
problem of the investor then reduces to the decision of which projects to let the intermediary
choose from.3
In contrast to the canonical setting, we assume that the investor is not aware of the
whole set Y but only of a closed subset YP ✓ Y . The intermediary, on the other hand, is
1For ✓ = 0 and ✓ = 1, this condition holds for, respectively, the right and left derivative.
2We can interpret   itself as the result of a contracting problem that generates   as the minimal level of
conflict of interest between the principal and the agent. An alternative reading is that the intermediary and
the investor have portfolios with di↵erent correlations across assets.
3Formally, the investor commits to a mechanism that specifies the project which will be implemented as a
function of the intermediary’s message. Alonso and Matouschek (2008) show that this contracting problem
is equivalent to delegating a set of projects D ✓ Y from which the investor can choose freely after observing
the state of the world.
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fully aware and has the possibility to make the investor aware of additional projects. After
updating her awareness, the investor then makes her delegation choice. The precise timing
is as follows:
1. The intermediary reveals a set of projects X ✓ Y and the investor updates her aware-
ness to bY ⌘ YP [X.
2. Given bY , the investor chooses a delegation set D 2 D(bY ), where D(bY ) is the collection
of closed subsets of bY .4
3. The intermediary observes the state of world ✓ and chooses an action from set D.
4. Payo↵s are realized.
In general, optimal awareness sets Yˆ and optimal delegation sets D will not be unique since
di↵erent awareness sets may induce the same delegation set and di↵erent delegation sets may
induce the same implemented actions for each state of the world. We will assume that if the
investor is indi↵erent between two delegation sets D and D0 such that D0 ⇢ D, she chooses
the larger set D. Similarly, we assume that if the intermediary is indi↵erent between two
revelation strategies that yield awareness sets bY and bY 0 such that bY 0 ⇢ bY , he expands the
investor’s awareness to bY . That is, we will consider the sets that yield maximal awareness
and maximal discretion.
Remark: It is important to point out that our model is agnostic to the question of
whether or not the investor is aware of her unawareness. What matters for the investor’s
expected payo↵ is the set of projects she permits the intermediary to implement. The investor
may be well aware of the fact that there exist other projects outside her awareness but since
she cannot include such projects in the delegation set, their existence does not a↵ect her
expected payo↵ or optimization problem.




We will start our analysis by describing optimal delegation under full awareness: YP = Y .
For this specification, the existing literature shows that if the density function f(✓) ⌘ F 0(✓)
satisfies the regularity condition f 0(✓)  + f(✓) > 0 for all ✓ 2 [0, 1], the optimal delegation
set is an interval (Martimort and Semenov, 2006, and Alonso and Matouschek, 2008). In
particular, if the bias is su ciently small so that the expected best project for the investor
E[✓   ]5 is strictly greater than ymin, the optimal delegation set is given by [ymin, yˆ], where
yˆ is such that
yˆ = E[✓    |✓   yˆ]. (1)
Otherwise the optimal delegation set is the singleton {ymin}. Hence, only if E[✓  ] > ymin,
the implemented project varies with the state of the world and delegation is valuable. In
that case, the intermediary chooses his preferred project y = ✓ for all ✓ < yˆ and the project
yˆ in all remaining states.
To understand why the optimal delegation set takes this form, it is useful to describe
the investor’s tradeo↵ in more detail. We can first explain why the optimal delegation set
does not have ”holes”. By adding the missing projects to the delegation set, the interme-
diary’s choice of projects as a function of the state becomes smoother: instead of switching
from a low to a high project at some threshold state ✓0, the implemented action increase
continuously with the realized state. Around ✓0 the intermediary’s preferred project lies in
between the low and the high project, which implies that he switches to higher actions in
states below ✓0 and to lower actions in states above ✓0. Since the agent is upward bias and
since the cost of moving away from the bliss point is convexly increasing for the investor, the
gain of moving closer to the bliss point in the states above ✓0 outweighs the cost of moving
5All expectations are taken with respect to F .
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away from the bliss point in the states below ✓0, as long as the probability weight attached to
the latter states is not too large. The regularity condition on the state distribution assures
that this is indeed the case.
The investor’s problem then reduces to finding the optimal upper and lower bound of the
delegation interval. Since the intermediary is upward biased it is never optimal to reduce the
intermediary’s flexibility from below, so the optimal lower bound is ymin. The optimal upper
bound is determined by condition (1). Notice that, conditional on the state being greater
than y, the investor’s expected preferred project is E[✓    |✓ > y]. Condition (1) says that
the optimal threshold yˆ is such that the project the intermediary implements in all states
above the threshold is exactly the investor’s expected preferred project in those states. The
assumption f 0(✓)  + f(✓) > 0 assures that there is only one such project.
We will adopt the condition f 0(✓)  + f(✓) > 0 throughout the analysis. Furthermore,
we will assume that in each state of the world both the investor’s and the intermediary’s
preferred project is available.6
Assumption 1. f 0(✓)  + f(✓) > 0 for all ✓ 2 (0, 1).
Assumption 2. ymin <    and ymax > 1.
3.2 Partial Awareness: Main Result
Our main result shows that, maintaining the regularity condition on the state distribution,
it is strictly optimal for the intermediary to leave the investor partially unaware if and only if
the investor is initially unaware of the project at the optimal threshold under full awareness,
yˆ. In that case, the intermediary optimally reveals projects at the extremes but leaves the
investor unaware of intermediate projects.
Theorem 3.1. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 be satisfied.
6The purpose of the latter assumption is to reduce the number of cases we need to distinguish.
9
• If y 2 Y P , the investor becomes fully aware and the optimal delegation set is [ymin, yˆ].
• If y 62 Y P , the investor remains unaware of projects in (yˆ  , yˆ+ ) for some   > 0
and the optimal delegation set is [ymin, yˆ   ] [ {yˆ + }.
Theorem 3.1 shows that whether the investor is made aware of all projects by the inter-
mediary is determined only by her awareness of yˆ, the optimal cap under full awareness. If
she is unaware of yˆ, the intermediary optimally leaves the investor unaware of an interval
of projects around yˆ. As we will show, this makes it optimal for the investor to choose a
delegation set that includes a project to the right of yˆ. By leaving the investor unaware of
intermediate projects, the intermediary thus incentivizes the investor to permit investment
projects that the intermediary is biased towards and that would be precluded under full






Figure 1: Equilibrium awareness and delegation
The statement of the proposition will be proven in a series of lemmas in the remainder of
this section. We proceed recursively by first considering the investor’s delegation choice for a
given awareness set bY . With the solution to this problem, we then turn to the intermediary’s
problem of choosing the optimal awareness set.
3.3 Delegation Choice
Let D⇤(bY ) denote the optimal delegation set when the awareness set is bY . Alonso and
Matouschek (2008) derive conditions under which, in the benchmark case of full awareness,
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the optimal delegation set is an interval and therefore has no gaps. They show that, provided
these conditions are satisfied, whenever the investor includes two distinct projects in the
delegation set, it is strictly optimal to include all projects that lie in between. As we
show in the Appendix, their argument perfectly generalizes to generic sets bY that may be
non-connected. In our setting Alonso and Matouschek’s (2008) conditions correspond to
Assumption 1. We thus obtain the following result.
Lemma 3.2 (Alonso and Matouschek, 2008). Let Assumption 1 be satisfied and consider
y1, y2 2 bY with y1 < y2. If y1, y2 2 D⇤(bY ), then all y 2 {bY \ (y1, y2)} belong to D⇤(bY ).
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
Lemma 3.2 implies that the optimal delegation set bY has no ”holes” with respect tobY . With this, we again only need to find the optimal lower and the upper bound of the
delegation set. The following lemma shows that, as in the case of full awareness, the investor
never finds it optimal to restrict the agent’s choice from below.
Lemma 3.3. The optimal delegation set satisfies minD⇤(bY ) = min bY .
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
The intuition for Lemma 3.3 is simple. Since the intermediary is biased upwards, when-
ever he prefers min bY over some other project in the delegation set, so does the investor.
Thus, in those states where the intermediary chooses min bY , the investor strictly prefers
min bY over any other project the intermediary can select. As a result, the investor optimally
includes min bY into the delegation set.
We turn next to the optimal upper bound of the delegation set. Here we can show that
the rightmost project the investor permits is the project in the investor’s awareness closest
to yˆ. Importantly, this project may be smaller or greater than yˆ and hence smaller or greater
than the optimal upper threshold in the benchmark case of full awareness.
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Lemma 3.4. Let Assumption 1 be satisfied. The optimal delegation set is such that
maxD⇤(bY ) = argmin
y2bY |y   yˆ|.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
To gain some intuition, consider the investor’s benefit of increasing the upper bound by
including an additional project y into delegation set D such that y > maxD. Adding y to the
delegation set changes the investor’s payo↵ in states ✓   (maxD+y)/2, since (maxD+y)/2
is the state at which the intermediary switches from project maxD to project y. The ex-
pected value of the investor’s preferred project in those states is E[✓  |✓   (maxD+y)/2].
By definition of yˆ and Assumption 1 this value is greater than (maxD + y)/2 if and only if
(maxD + y)/2 is smaller than yˆ. In this case, since maxD and y have the same distance to
(maxD+ y)/2, the project y is then in expectation closer to the investor’s preferred project
than maxD. Therefore, if (maxD+y)/2 < yˆ, the investor prefers to add y to the delegation
set D. Clearly, the condition (maxD + y)/2 < yˆ is equivalent to the requirement that the
distance between yˆ and y is smaller than that between yˆ and maxD. A perfectly symmetric
argument implies that if (maxD + y)/2 > yˆ, that is if maxD is closer to yˆ than y, the
investor strictly prefers not to include project y.
The fact that the optimal upper bound is the project in Yˆ that is closest to yˆ has two
implications: first, the optimal delegation set includes all projects belonging to Yˆ that are
weakly smaller that yˆ; second, it includes at most one project strictly greater than yˆ. In
particular, the investor permits the agent to invest in a project y > yˆ if and only if the
largest element of Yˆ that is smaller than yˆ has at least the same distance to yˆ.
Taken together, the optimal delegation under partial awareness can be seen as the closest
approximation of the optimal delegation set under full awareness, [ymin, yˆ], available to the










Figure 2: Optimal delegation set D⇤(Yˆ )
3.4 Awareness Choice
We can now turn to the intermediary’s optimal strategy of expanding the investor’s aware-
ness. As a first observation, note that if the investor is aware of the threshold project yˆ, the
intermediary optimally reveals all other projects. Since there is no threshold closer to yˆ than
yˆ itself, the upper bound of the optimal delegation set will always be yˆ. Revealing projects
above yˆ is thereby irrelevant; the investor will never allow the intermediary to implement any
of them. On the other hand, revealing projects below the threshold yˆ is strictly optimal since
they are always included into the optimal delegation set. The intermediary thus maximizes
his choice by revealing all projects to the investor, who then optimally chooses delegation
set [0, yˆ].
The above argument implies that, starting with an arbitrary set Y P , the optimal aware-
ness set bY ⇤ has to be such that the upper bound of the corresponding delegation set is at
least yˆ. Moreover, provided that the investor is unaware of the project yˆ, the only reason
for the intermediary to leave the investor unaware of a set of projects is to incentivize the
investor to permit some project strictly ro the right of the threshold yˆ. By Lemma 3.4 this
is optimal for the investor if and only if the investor is unaware of all projects that are closer
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to yˆ. It follows then that the optimal awareness set is of the form
Yˆ ⇤ = [ymin, yˆ   ] [ [yˆ + , ymax]
for some     0. Excluding projects in [ymin, yˆ   ] or the project {yˆ + } strictly reduces
the intermediaries choice set, while excluding any projects strictly greater that yˆ +   is
irrelevant. Given Yˆ ⇤, the investor’s optimal delegation set is
D⇤(Yˆ ⇤) = [ymin, yˆ   ] [ {yˆ + }
The intermediary is thus permitted to choose from an interval of projects strictly to the left
of the full awareness threshold yˆ and one project to the right. In response to this delegation
set, the intermediary’s optimal policy is as follows. In states below yˆ    the intermediary
uses his flexibility and implements his preferred project y = ✓. In states above yˆ     the
preferred project is not available, so the intermediary chooses the one closest to his bliss
point. For states in the interval (yˆ    , yˆ) this is the project {yˆ    }, for the remaining
states it is {yˆ + }. The intermediary’s optimal policy can thus be summarized by
y⇤(✓; ) =
8><>:
✓ if ✓  yˆ   
yˆ    if yˆ    < ✓ < yˆ
yˆ +  if yˆ  ✓
We can observe that even though the investor only permits one project to the right of the
full awareness threshold yˆ, this project is implemented in all states above yˆ.
Taken together, the previous analysis provides us with a very simple description of the
class of delegation and awareness sets that are candidates for an equilibrium in our environ-
ment: when deciding which projects to reveal to the investor, the intermediary implicitly
chooses an awareness gap, parametrized by  . To complete the proof of Theorem 3.1 it then
remains to show that whenever a gap is feasible, it is also optimal.
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To find the optimal value of  , we can consider the reduced form problem of the in-
termediary. The feasible values of   are determined by the initial level of awareness of
the investor Y P . In particular, the implementable values of   are weakly smaller than
 ¯(YP ) := miny2YP |y   yˆ|, the minimal distance between a project in the investor’s aware-
ness and the threshold yˆ. For each   in that set, the intermediary then anticipates the
investor’s optimal delegation set D⇤ and his own choice of projects y⇤(✓; ). Substituting






(yˆ     ✓)2f(✓)d✓  
Z 1
yˆ
(yˆ +   ✓)2f(✓)d✓ (P )
Proposition 3.5. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 be satisfied. The solution of problem P is given
by Min[ ¯(bY ), ⇤], where  ⇤ solves
(1  F (yˆ   ⇤)) [E[✓|✓   yˆ   ⇤]  (yˆ   ⇤)] = 2(1  F (yˆ)) . (2)
Proof. See Appendix B.4.
Proposition 3.5 characterizes the optimal awareness gap. In the proof we show that the
intermediary’s payo↵ as a function of   is strictly concave and attains its maximum at  ⇤,
as determined by (2). Crucially, the unconstrained solution  ⇤ is strictly positive. Formally,
this can be seen by noting that at   = 0 the second factor on the left hand side of (2) is
equal to   (by definition of yˆ). At   = 0 the left-hand side is thus strictly smaller than
the right-hand side. To gain some intuition, consider the net e↵ect on the intermediary’s
expected payo↵ when increasing the gap at   = 0. The marginal benefit of increasing  
is the increase in the intermediary’s utility in states ✓ > yˆ. Here the cap yˆ forces the in-
termediary to take an action that is too low from his point of view. By introducing a gap,
he can increase the implemented action in these states, thereby getting closer to his bliss
point. The marginal cost of increasing   is the utility loss in the states close to yˆ, where the
intermediary moves away from his bliss point. Since, however, the marginal e↵ect on utility













Figure 3: Optimal delegation set D⇤(Yˆ )
that the optimal value of   is strictly positive.
As can be verified, the unconstrained solution  ⇤ is increasing in the size of the bias  .
That is, the larger the divergence between the investor’s and the intermediary’s preferred in-
vestment is, the more investment projects the intermediary wants to hide from the investor.
The solution  ⇤ is implemented whenever the investor’s initial awareness does not constrain
the intermediary in his choice of the gap. If, however, the investor is aware of some project
in the interval (yˆ   ⇤, yˆ + ⇤), the intermediary’s optimal strategy is to simply choose the
largest feasible gap, as shown in Figure 3. The following example illustrates the findings for
the uniform distribution.
Example: Suppose f(✓) = 1. The optimal threshold in the benchmark case of full aware-
ness is then given by yˆ = 1   2  and the interior solution for the optimal awareness set,
characterized by condition (2), is  ⇤ = 2 
 p
2  1 . If 2   p2  1    ¯(Y P ), the interme-
diary leaves the investor unaware of all projects in the interval
 
1  2 p2, 1 + 2   p2  2  .
The resulting equilibrium awareness and delegation sets are then given by
bY ⇤ = [ymin, 1  2 p2] [ [1 + 2  ⇣p2  2⌘ , ymax],




2  1    ¯(Y P ) is not satisfied, the intermediary is restricted by the investor’s
initial awareness and therefore leaves her unaware of all projects in the smaller interval⇣
1  2     ¯(bY P ), 1  2  +  ¯(bY P )⌘.
4 Competition
The previous section characterized the equilibrium in an environment where the intermedi-
ary is a monopolist and, by implication, fully determines the investor’s awareness. In reality,
investors can seek consult from multiple financial professionals, possibly to expand their
choice between di↵erent investment options. To capture the interaction between multiple
intermediaries, we adopt a simple model of imperfect competition that has been recently
proposed by Lester et al. (2017) and is based on the work of Burdett and Judd (1983).
Considering a model of imperfect competition accounts for some important features of the
financial market, especially over-the-counter trading. It further allows us to consider the
e↵ect of the degree of competition on the awareness of investors and the composition of
financial products traded in the market.
Environment: Following the approach of Lester et al. (2017), we assume that there are
two intermediaries and a unit measure of investors.7 Intermediaries have no capacity con-
straints and can therefore contract with many investors. There is a friction in that investors
do not necessarily have access to both intermediaries. In particular, a fraction of investors
is matched with one intermediaries, while the remaining investors are matched with both.
As in Lester et al. (2017), we refer to investors that have access to only one intermediary
as captive. Whether an investor is captive or non-captive is not observable to the interme-
diaries. Instead, from the viewpoint of an intermediary, conditional on meeting a particular
investor, the investor is non-captive with some probability, denoted by ⇡. The parameter ⇡
can then be viewed as a measure of competitiveness in the market: if ⇡ = 0 we are back in
7As Lester et al. (2017) show, the restriction to two intermediaries can be easily relaxed.
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the monopoly case; if ⇡ = 1 intermediaries engage in Bertrand competition.
To simplify matters we will first assume that investors are initially unaware of all projects.
Upon meeting an investor, intermediaries disclose a set of investment projects, as before. If
an investor meets with two intermediaries, her updated awareness set is the union of the
projects that are revealed by either of the two intermediaries. The investor then needs
to decide to which of the intermediaries to delegate her investment. In principle, after
updating her awareness, the investor is indi↵erent between both intermediaries. To make
competition matter, we assume here that the investor chooses the intermediary that reveals
more investment opportunities. More specifically, if the set revealed by the first intermediary
is a strict subset of the set revealed by the second, the investor chooses the second, and
viceversa. If both intermediaries choose the same awareness set or if the awareness sets
cannot be ordered, the investor chooses either intermediary with equal probability. Once an
investor selects an intermediary, the interactions unfolds exactly as in the monopoly case.
For a given investor, the timing can be summarized as follows:
1. The investor privately observes whether she meets one or two intermediaries.
2. Each intermediary reveals a set of projects and the investor updates her awareness to
the union of both sets.
3. The investor chooses an intermediary and a delegation set.
4. The selected intermediary observes the state of world and chooses an action from the
delegation set.
5. Payo↵s are realized.
The assumption that an investor delegates to the intermediary that reveals more invest-
ment opportunities directly implies that intermediaries optimally choose awareness sets of
the form [ymin, yˆ  ][ [yˆ+ , ymax],    0. Intermediaries, therefore, compete over aware-
ness gaps, parameterized by  : a smaller value of   increases an intermediaries chances of
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being chosen by the investor he meets.
Remark: An alternative assumption that gives rise to the same property is the assump-
tion that the set of projects delegated to a particular intermediary has to be a subset of the
set of projects the intermediary reveals. This can be interpreted as the intermediary o↵ering
a set of projects to which he has access and the investor restricting the intermediary’s choice
to a subset of those.
Payo↵s: An intermediary’s expected payo↵ is the product of the probability of being
chosen by the investor and his conditional expected payo↵. Using the intermediary’s optimal











From the analysis in Section 3 we know that U( ) is strictly concave and attains its maximum
at  ⇤, as determined by (2). The probability that an intermediary is selected by the investor
depends on the strategy of the other intermediary. Letting H( ) denote the probability that
the other intermediary chooses an awareness gap smaller than  , the probability that the
investor delegates to the competitor is given by the product of the conditional probability
that the investor meets the other intermediary and H( ). Letting U¯ denote the outside
option of both intermediaries, an intermediary’s expected payo↵ is then given by
(1  ⇡H( ))U( ) + ⇡H( )U¯ . (3)
We assume that intermediation can be profitable, that is: U¯ < U( ⇤).
Equilibrium: A symmetric equilibrium in this environment is a (cumulative) distri-
bution function H⇤( ) such that intermediaries are indi↵erent between all elements in the
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support of H⇤ and weakly prefer those over any other values of  . Since U( ) is strictly
decreasing for   >  ⇤, the support of H⇤ has to be a subset of [0, ⇤]. Standard arguments
show that H⇤ is continuous. The intermediaries’ strategy thus has no mass point, except
possibly at   = 0.
We are now ready to describe the equilibrium distribution H⇤ in this environment. While
the appendix provides a complete characterization of H⇤, we focus here on some key features
of the equilibrium.
Proposition 4.1. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 be satisfied. In the environment with imperfect
competition, there exists an equilibrium, characterized by H⇤, with the following properties:
• if ⇡  ⇡, the support of H⇤ is [ 0, ⇤] for some  0   0;
• if ⇡ < ⇡ < ⇡, the support of H⇤ is {0} [ [ 0, ⇤] for some  0 > 0;
• if ⇡  ⇡, the support of H⇤ is {0};
where 0 < ⇡  ⇡  1.
Proof. See Appendix B.5.
Proposition 4.1 shows that there are three parameter regions to be distinguished. If the
degree of competition is su ciently small, then intermediaries choose awareness gaps param-
eterized by values of   in the interval [ 0, ⇤]. As we show in the proof of Proposition 4.1,
the size of this interval is strictly increasing in the competition parameter ⇡. Consequently,
the more competition there is, the smaller is the minimal awareness gap. At the thresh-
old ⇡, the lower bound of the interval,  0, is zero. When ⇡ increases further we observe
polarization: there is a strictly positive probability that intermediaries disclose everything
(  = 0), while otherwise they leave investors unaware of a significant part of the available
investment opportunities. As ⇡ increases further, the probability that intermediaries leave
investors unaware of certain projects becomes smaller, up to the point where this probabil-









Figure 4: Equilibrium distribution H⇤ under imperfect competition
threshold, intermediaries then fully reveal. Figure 4 depicts the equilibrium distribution for
the di↵erent regimes of ⇡.
We thus find that competition promotes unawareness. In fact we can show that as ⇡
increases the equilibrium distribution is shifted towards smaller values of  .
Corollary 4.2. Let Assumption 1 and 2 be satisfies and let 0  ⇡ < ⇡0  1. In the
environment with imperfect competition, the equilibrium distribution H⇤ under ⇡ first-order
stochastically dominates the one under ⇡0.
Proof. See Appendix B.6.
Summing up, in the proposed environment the disclosure of available investment oppor-
tunities is an instrument to compete for costumers. An interesting question is how the extent
to which investors are left unaware of certain investment opportunities varies over the busi-
ness cycle. In our framework the state of the economy might be captured by the profitability
of investments: when the economy is doing well, financial market investments yield partic-
ularly high returns, some of which are appropriated by the financial intermediaries. In our
model we thus interpret good times as an upward shift of U( ) relative to U . We find that
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as the gap between U( ) and U increases, the equilibrium distribution H⇤ shifts towards
smaller values of  , illustrated in Figure 5. That is, when the gains from intermediation
increase, investors become aware of more and more investment opportunities. Intuitively,
when the value of attracting an investor becomes larger, competition for investors increases
and this results in smaller awareness gaps. Viceversa, when times are bad and gains from
intermediation are small, intermediaries worry less about loosing investors to competitors
and hence behave more predatory. Our model therefore predicts that in bad times we will
observe more banks taking advantage of costumers by hiding certain investment opportuni-







Figure 5: Equilibrium awareness in good and bad times
4.1 Heterogenous Investors
Thus far we have assumed that investors are equally sophisticated, in particular that they
are all completely unaware.8 In reality, investors vary widely in their financial literacy, which
gives rise to the question of how intermediaries optimally act when investors di↵er in their
8The extension to the case where investors are homogenous but aware of some projects is straight forward.
In this case we find the largest feasible value of   and, if it turns out to be smaller than  ⇤, repeat the
derivation of the equilibrium above, replacing  ⇤ with that value.
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awareness. Will the presence of more sophisticated investors be beneficial or detrimental to
the welfare of the less sophisticated ones?
To address this question in the simplest fashion, we assume that there are two types of
investors, sophisticated ones that are aware of all investment opportunities and naive ones
that are aware of none. We denote the fraction of naive investors by µ and assume that each
investor is privately informed about her type. Upon meeting an investor, an intermediary
is then confronted with two unknowns. He does not know whether the investor has access
to the second intermediary and he does not know whether the investor is sophisticated or
naive. If the investor is sophisticated, she delegates the optimal interval under full aware-
ness, [0, yˆ], no matter how much the intermediary reveals. Nevertheless, she still rewards an
intermediary for disclosure by choosing the one that reveals more. If the investor is naive,
everything remains as above.
Intermediaries then compete over awareness gaps, parametrized by  . An intermediary’s
expected payo↵ as a function of   is now given by
(1  ⇡H( ))[µU( ) + (1  µ)U(0)] + ⇡H( )U¯ . (4)
Following the steps of the equilibrium construction above, we can characterize the equilibrium
for this environment and obtain the same properties as described in Proposition 4.1.9 Of
course, the equilibrium distribution H⇤ will now depend on µ. The following proposition
shows that, provided intermediaries can make positive profits with sophisticated investors,
an increase in the fraction of sophisticates leads intermediaries to disclose more investment
opportunities in equilibrium.
Proposition 4.3. Let Assumption 1 and 2 be satisfies. Assume U < U(0) and let 0 
µ < µ0  1. In the environment with heterogenous investors, the equilibrium distribution H⇤
under µ is first-order stochastically dominated by the distribution under µ0.
9For details see the proof of Proposition 4.3.
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Proof. See Appendix B.7.
The result in Proposition 4.3 is intuitive. Whenever an intermediary meets a sophisti-
cated investor, revealing additional investment opportunities does not a↵ect the delegation
set the investor determines but increases the probability with which the investor delegates
to him. The assumption U(0) > U¯ implies that intermediaries make strictly positive prof-
its with sophisticated investors, thus, conditional on meeting a sophisticated investor, it is
optimal to fully reveal. By implication, the larger the probability an intermediary attaches
to the event of meeting a sophisticated investor is, the more attractive revealing additional
projects becomes. The presence of sophisticated investors in the market consequently leads
to more disclosure and thereby benefits the naive types.
Suppose now that intermediaries can make positive profits with naive investors but not
with sophisticated ones. If intermediaries can reject sophisticated investors, the equilibrium
is as if they did not exist and so the previous analysis applies. There are, however, situa-
tions where it is reasonable to assume that intermediaries cannot avoid negative profits with
certain type of investors. For example, advising and setting up a contract may imply certain
opportunity costs. If the investor’s type is initially unknown and if the expected profits
with sophisticated investors do not compensate the opportunity costs, intermediaries make
losses with such investors. As long as these losses are compensated by the profits with other
investors, intermediaries may still find it worthwhile to enter the market.
In our framework this situation is captured by the specification U(0) < U¯ < µU( ⇤) +
(1   µ)U(0) and the assumption that intermediaries cannot reject any delegation sets. In
contrast to the previous case, intermediaries are then no longer interested in attracting
sophisticated investors but would rather have them go to competitors. This brings about a
new interesting equilibrium property.
Proposition 4.4. Let Assumption 1 and 2 be satisfies. Assume U( ) < U < µU( ⇤) +
(1   µ)U(0) and let 0  µ < µ0  1. In the environment with heterogenous investors,
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the equilibrium distribution H⇤ under µ first-order stochastically dominates the distribution
under µ0.
Proof. See Appendix B.7.
Proposition 4.4 shows that a larger share of sophisticated investors leads to more un-
awareness among naive investors. Given U(0) < U , revealing all investment opportunities
cannot be optimal for intermediaries. Indeed, regardless of how large ⇡ is, there is no ’full
awareness’ equilibrium. Instead, intermediaries randomize across an interval of values of  
bounded away from zero. The losses they make with sophisticates can thereby be compen-
sated with the profits they make with naive investors. The larger the share of sophisticated
investors is, the larger this compensation has to be. Hence, as µ decreases, the equilibrium
distribution shifts towards higher values of  . The presence of sophisticated investors in the
market thus reduces the awareness and, by implication, the welfare of naive investors.
The feature that there is unawareness in equilibrium - no matter how intense competition
is - with cross-subsidization across naive and sophisticated investors is reminiscent of the
shrouding equilibrium in Gabaix and Laibson (2006). In their work, firms hide costly add-
ons, which in equilibrium will be purchased by naive customers only.
5 Policy Implications and Conclusion
The paper has implications for bank regulation and brokerage practices. Given that small
investors are those more likely to have limited awareness, our results show that banks may
have incentives to eliminate investment opportunities with intermediate levels of risk so as to
induce investments in risky assets. Of course educating investors about available investment
options, thereby expanding Y P , benefits investors in our environment. In reality, however,
promoting full awareness in that way might not always be feasible or might be very expensive.
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The results of our paper suggest that there exists a substantively more e↵ective inter-
vention. We have seen that what determines the final awareness of an investor is not the
number of investment products of which she is initially aware but rather how close to the
optimal cap under full awareness these products are. In our stylized model, it is su cient
that the investor is aware of yˆ and the intermediary will make him fully aware. This in turn
implies that all a regulator must do is promoting awareness of exactly that product, e.g.
by issuing and publicly propagating a financial product with the characteristics of yˆ. An
intermediary will then find it in his best interest to educate the investor about the remaining
investment opportunities. Notably, it is not even crucial that the regulator issues exactly yˆ.
As long as the issued product is relatively close, the set of investment opportunities of which
the investor remains unaware is very small, as we illustrate in Figure 6. Our findings thus
point to an important complementarity between the regulator and private actors, suggesting
that a relatively simple policy intervention can lead banks to reveal investment opportunities
more suitable to the needs of investors.
Additonally revealed products
y` ymaxymin
Publicly issued financial product
YP
y
Figure 6: Policy intervention and equilibrium awareness
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A Microfoundation of Quadratic Loss Preferences
Suppose the investment choice is captured by the classical trade-o↵ between the mean µ and
the standard deviation   of the investment and let the mean-standard deviation frontier be
determined by:10
µ =  (✓) + ✓ , (5)
where ✓ 2 [0, 1] is the state of the world. The tradeo↵ between mean and standard deviation
changes stochastically with the state of the world. Investor and intermediary display di↵erent
aversions to asset volatility. The intermediary’s preferences are represented by
u(µ,  ) = µ  1
2
 2,
while the investor’s preferences are assumed to be:
v(µ,  ) = µ       1
2
 2.
It is easy to verify that by substituting for µ and and maximizing the agents’ utility functions
over the standard variation, we find that the intermediaries preferred policy is   = ✓, while
the investor’s is   = ✓    . The model described here is indeed equivalent to the one we
considered in the main part of the paper. We can therefore interpret the choice of y in the
main model as a choice over the riskiness of the investment, where, conditional on the state,
the intermediary always prefers a riskier investment product than the agent.
10A simple reference for such restriction is the Capital Allocation Line in the basic model of portfolio
selection (Markowiz (1952, 1959), Tobin (1958)). In the general equilibrium version of this model, ✓ = s(✓)m(✓) ,
where s(✓) and m(✓) are, respectively, the standard deviation and the mean of the stochastic discount factor.




For the proofs of the following results it is useful to introduce the terms
T (y) := F (y) (y   E[✓    |✓  y]) ,
and
S(y) := (1  F (y)) (y   E[✓    |✓   y]) ,
in the literature referred to as, respectively, backward bias and forward bias (see Alonso and
Matouschek, 2008). By Assumption 1 we have
T 00(y) =  f 0(y) + f(y) > 0 and S 00(y) =  ( f 0(y) + f(y)) < 0 for all y 2 [0, 1]
Noticing that S(yˆ) = S(1) = 0, strict concavity of S implies that S(y) > 0 for all y 2 (yˆ, 1).
B.1 Proof of Lemma 3.2
Suppose not and let y 2 bY be such that y 62 D⇤(bY ) and D⇤(bY ) \ [ymin, y] 6= ;, D⇤(bY ) \
[y, ymax] 6= ;. Further, let y  be the largest element of D⇤(bY ) strictly smaller than y and let
y+ be the smallest element of D⇤(bY ) strictly greater than y, that is y  = max{y0 2 D⇤(bY ) :
y0 < y} and y  = min{y0 2 D⇤(bY ) : y0 > y}. Define s := y +y+2 to be the state at which the
intermediary is indi↵erent between choosing project y  and project y+, and similarly define
r := y+y
 
2 and t :=
y++y
2 be the states in which the intermediary is indi↵erent, respectively,
between choosing y  and y and between y+ and y.
Following Alonso and Matouschek (2008), we can write the change in the investor’s payo↵
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when including project y into the delegation set as follows




(y   ✓ +  )2f(✓)d✓ +
Z s
r
(y    ✓ +  )2f(✓)d✓ +
Z t
s
(y+   ✓ +  )2f(✓)d✓
= (y   y )F (r) [r   E [✓    |✓  r]]| {z }
=T (r)
(y+   y)F (t) [t  E [✓    |✓  t]]| {z }
=T (t)
 2(y+   y )F (s) [s  E [✓    |✓  s]]| {z }
=T (s)
Letting y =  y+ + (1    )y  for some   2 (0, 1) so that y   y  =  (y+   y ), y+   y =
(1   )(y+   y ) and s =  r + (1   )t, the payo↵ di↵erence can be written as
E[v(D⇤(bY ), ✓)]  E[v(D⇤(bY )\{y}, ✓)] = (y+   y ) [ T (r) + (1   )T (t)  T ( r + (1   )t)] ,
From the strict convexity of T , it then follows that the payo↵ di↵erence is strictly positive.
A contradiction.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 3.3
Consider delegation set D with minD(bY ) > min bY . Letting y = min bY and y = minD(by),
the state at which the intermediary is indi↵erent between the two projects is given by s :=
(y + y)/2. If the investor includes y in the delegation set, the intermediary switches from y





(y   ✓ +  )2f(✓)d✓ +
Z s
0





(y   y)(y + y)  2(y   y)(✓    )⇤ f(✓)d✓,
= 2(y   y)T (s) ,
which is strictly positive. Including y in the delegation set therefore strictly increases the
investor’s payo↵, which implies minD⇤(bY ) = min bY .
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B.3 Proof of Lemma 3.4
Consider delegation set D and suppose maxD < max bY . Let y = maxD and consider
project y > maxD such that y 2 bY . Let t = y+y2 denote the state at which the intermediary
is indi↵erent between the two projects. When t < 1, the change in the investor’s payo↵ when




(y   ✓ +  )2f(✓)d✓ +
Z 1
t




[(y   y)(y + y)  2(y   y)(✓    )] f(✓)d✓,
=  2(y   y)S (t) .
This change is weakly positive if S(t)  0, i.e. if t  yˆ. The condition t  yˆ is equivalent to
y + y
2
 yˆ , y   yˆ  yˆ   y.
Since y > yˆ, this condition can only be satisfied if y < yˆ. Given this, the inequality is always
satisfied when y  yˆ. It is also satisfied when y > yˆ, provided that d(y, yˆ)  d(y, y). By a
perfectly symmetric argument  2(y   y)S (t) is strictly negative if y   yˆ > yˆ   y, which is
satisfied if and only if d(y, yˆ) > d(y, yˆ).
B.4 Proof of Proposition 3.5














[yˆ     ✓] f(✓)d✓   2
Z 1
yˆ
[yˆ +   ✓] f(✓)d✓, (6)
@2U( )
@ 2
=  2[1  F (yˆ   )] < 0 (7)
11When t   1 including y has no e↵ect on the investor’s payo↵ since the intermediary never chooses y.
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U( ) is strictly concave in   and hence has a unique solution on [0,  ¯(bY )]. Recalling that





= 2[1  F (yˆ)]  > 0.
The derivative is strictly positive, which implies that whenever  ¯(YP ) > 0, the optimal value
of   is strictly positive. The interior solution of the intermediary’s optimization problem,
 ⇤, is characterized by the first-order condition that equalizes the expression (6) to zero.
After rearranging terms  ⇤ solves:
(1  F (yˆ   ⇤)) (E[✓|✓   yˆ   ⇤]  (yˆ   ⇤)) = 2(1  F (yˆ)) .
B.5 Proof of Proposition 4.1
Suppose first that both intermediaries choose  = 0 in equilibrium and consider the deviation
of one intermediary. Since   = 0 maximizes an investor’s payo↵, any deviating o↵er will
only be accepted if the investor is captive. The best deviating o↵er is thus characterized by
 ⇤. This deviation is not profitable if










Letting ⇡ be the value of ⇡ at which (8) holds as equality, it is easy to verify that (8) holds
for all ⇡   ⇡.
Suppose now there is a positive probability with which intermediaries choose a non-zero
gap. Since H cannot have a mass point at   > 0, it follows that there is an interval of values
of   across which intermediaries are indi↵erent. Di↵erentiation of (3) yields the following
first order conditions:
(1  ⇡H( ))U 0( ) = ⇡H 0( )(U( )  U¯) for   > 0;
(1  ⇡H( ))U 0( )   ⇡H 0( )(U( )  U¯) for   = 0;
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Let Hˆ(·) be the solution of the di↵erential equation defined by the first order condition with
border condition Hˆ( ⇤) = 1. We have
Hˆ( ) =
U( )  [⇡U¯ + (1  ⇡)U( ⇤)]
⇡[U( )  U¯ ] .
Suppose Hˆ(0)  0 and consider the following candidate equilibrium distribution:
H⇤( ) =
8><>:
0 if     0
U( ) [⇡U¯+(1 ⇡)U( ⇤)]
⇡[U( ) U¯ ] if   2 ( min, ⇤)
1 if      ⇤
with  0 such that U( 0) = ⇡U¯ + (1   ⇡)U( ⇤). Any value of   strictly smaller than  0
cannot be optimal as it yields the same trading probability but a lower conditional payo↵
than  0. The equilibrium exists if indeed Hˆ(0)  0, or equivalently
U(0)  ⇡U¯ + (1  ⇡)U( ⇤) (9)
Letting ⇡ denote the value of ⇡ at which (9) is satisfied with equality, the characterized
equilibrium exists if ⇡  ⇡.
Finally, consider an equilibrium where H⇤ has a mass point at   = 0. Notice first that
the intermediaries’ strategy cannot have a mass point at zero and at the same time positive
density arbitrarily close to zero, since   = 0 yields a strictly higher payo↵ than any   close
to zero. The support of H⇤( ) thus has to have a gap. More precisely, suppose the support
of H⇤( ) is given by {0} [ [ 0, ⇤], where  0 is such that, given H⇤( ) = Hˆ( ), 8     0,














The left hand side is equal to ⇡U¯ + (1   ⇡)U( ⇤) and thus constant in  0, while the right
hand side is strictly decreasing in  0. At  0 = 0 the left hand side is strictly larger than the
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right hand side when condition (9) is violated and at  0 =  ⇤ the left hand side is strictly
smaller than the right hand side when condition (12) is violated. Hence, whenever neither
of the above equilibria exists, condition (10) has a unique solution in (0, ⇤). We then have
H⇤( ) =
8>>>><>>>>:
0 if   < 0
Hˆ( 0) if   2 [0, 0]
U( ) [⇡U¯+(1 ⇡)U( ⇤)]
⇡[U( ) U¯ ] if   2 ( 0, ⇤)
1 if      ⇤
where  0 is defined by (10).
B.6 Proof of Proposition 4.2





⇡2[U( )  U¯ ] > 0 (11)
For the case ⇡  ⇡, this immediately yields the stated property. Consider then the case
⇡ < ⇡ < ⇡. Given the above property, it remains to show that the mass point at   = 0 is
greater when ⇡ is greater. A su cient condition is that the lower bound of the randomization
interval,  0 as determined by (10) is increasing in ⇡. Solving (10) for U( 0) we obtain
U( 0) =
1
2(⇡U + (1  ⇡)U( ⇤))(U(0) + U)  U(0)U
⇡U + (1  ⇡)U( ⇤)  12(U + U(0))







(⇡U + (1  ⇡)U( ⇤)  12(U + U(0)))2
> 0
Since U strictly increases in   on [0, ⇤], it follows that  0 strictly increases in ⇡. Together
with (11) this implies that the statement of Proposition 4.2 is satisfied. Finally, for ⇡  ⇡,
a marginal change in ⇡ has no e↵ect.
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B.7 Proof of Proposition 4.3
The construction of the equilibrium is analogous to the one in Section B.5. The equilibrium
in which both intermediaries choose   = 0 exists if a deviation to   =  ⇤ is not profitable.
This requires










When the above condition is not satisfied intermediaries randomize across di↵erent values
of  . We can first derive the function Hˆ( ). Di↵erentiating the intermediaries’ expected
payo↵ in (4) yields
(1  ⇡H( ))µU 0( ) = ⇡H 0( )(µU( ) + (1  µ)U(0)  U¯) for   > 0;
(1  ⇡H( ))µU 0( )   ⇡H 0( )(µU( ) + (1  µ)U(0)  U¯) for   = 0.
With the condition Hˆ( ⇤) = 1 we obtain
Hˆ( ) =
µU( )  [⇡U¯ + (1  ⇡)µU( ⇤)  ⇡(1  µ)U(0)]
⇡[µU( ) + (1  µ)U(0)  U¯ ] .
If Hˆ(0)  0, or equivalently
(1  ⇡)µ(U( ⇤)  U(0))   ⇡(U(0)  U¯), (13)
there exists an equilibrium with
H⇤( ) =
8><>:
0 if     min
Hˆ( ) if   2 ( min, ⇤)
1 if      ⇤
(14)
where  min is such that µU( min) = [⇡U¯ + (1  ⇡)µU( ⇤)  ⇡(1  µ)U(0)].
Finally, we consider the case where the equilibrium distribution H⇤ with a mass point at
  = 0. As before, let  0 be defined as the value of   such that, given H⇤( ) = Hˆ( ), 8   
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By the same argument as in Section B.5, condition (15) has a unique solution in (0, ⇤) if
and only if neither of the above equilibria exists. Just notice that the left hand side of (15)
is equal to ⇡U¯ + (1  ⇡)[µU( ⇤) + (1  µ)U(0)]. We then have
H⇤( ) =
8>>>><>>>>:
0 if   < 0
Hˆ( 0) if   2 [0, 0]
Hˆ( ) if   2 ( 0, ⇤)
1 if      ⇤
(16)
with  0 defined by (15).
Consider now an increase in µ. For values of µ su ciently close to zero condition (12) is
always satisfied, so a marginal change of µ has no e↵ect on the equilibrium distribution. As
µ increases condition (12) may be violated and we enter the region where the equilibrium
is described by (16). Notice first that  0, as determined by (15) is decreasing in µ. This
follows from the fact that the left hand side is shifted upwards as µ is increases, whereas the
right hand side does not depend on µ. The probability that an intermediary chooses   = 0
in equilibrium is thus decreasing in µ. Notice further that di↵erentiating Hˆ( ) with respect





⇡[µU( ) + (1  µ)U(0)  U¯ ]2 (17)
The above term is strictly negative for all   <  ⇤, which implies that the function Hˆ( )
shifts downwards as µ increases. Together with the property that the probability with which
intermediaries choose   = 0 decreases as µ increases this implies that, within the considered
parameter region, a higher value of µ results in an equilibrium distribution function that
first order stochastically dominates the distribution associated to a lower value of µ.
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Finally, when µ increases further, we may enter the parameter region where the equilib-
rium is characterized by (14). The fact that Hˆ( ) shifts downwards when µ increases here
directly validates the statement of Proposition 4.3.
B.8 Proof of Proposition 4.4
Under the assumption U(0) < U¯ , condition (13) is always satisfied, so the equilibrium
distribution H⇤ is given by (14). We then just need to show that Hˆ shifts upwards as µ
increases. This follows directly from (17).
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